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Abstract
Plaintiffs brought a class action on behalf of all licensed physicians performing abortions or
wishing to perform abortions, and on behalf of their patients desiring the termination of pregnancy,’ to have declared unconstitutional House Bill 1211 of the Missouri General Assembly, 2
and seeking an injunction against its enforcement.
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Constitutional Law: The State Cannot Require
Spousal or Parental Consent for Abortions during the
First Trimester of Pregnancy: Planned Parenthood
of Missouri v. Danforth

Plaintiffs brought a class action on behalf of all licensed physicians
performing abortions or wishing to perform abortions, and on behalf of
their patients desiring the termination of pregnancy,' to have declared2
unconstitutional House Bill 1211 of the Missouri General Assembly,
and seeking an injunction against its enforcement.
Plaintiffs challenged Section 3(2), s which required the patient,
prior to submitting to an abortion during the first trimester (twelve
weeks) of pregnancy, to certify in writing her free and informed consent
to the operation;' Section 3(3),5 which required, during the first trimester of pregnancy, the written consent of the woman's spouse, unless the
abortion was deemed necessary by a licensed physician to preserve the
life of the mother;$ and Section 3(4),J which required written consent of
one parent or person in loco parentis of the woman if she was unmarried
and under eighteen, unless the abortion was certified by a licensed physician as necessary to preserve the life of the mother.8 A three-judge
1. 96 S.Ct. 2831 (1976).
2. H.R. 1211, 77th Missouri General Assembly (1974). Later codified as Mo.
ANN. STAT. §§ 188.010 et seq.; 188.015; 188.020; 188.035; 188.050; 188.060 (1974).
3. Id. § 3 (2). Later codified as Mo. ANN. STAT. § 188.020 (2) (1974).
4. 96 S.Ct. at 2836.
5. § 3(3) H.B. No. 1211, 77th Missouri General Assembly (1974). Later codified
as Mo. ANN. STAT. § 188.020(3) (1974).

6. 96 S.Ct. at 2836.
7. § 3(4) H.B. No. 1211, 77th Missouri General Assembly (1974). Later codified
as Mo. ANN. STAT. § 188.020(4).
8. 96 S.Ct. at 2836. Although not relevant to the point of this article, plaintiffs
also challenged Mo. ANN. STAT. § 188.015(2) (1974), defining viability; § 188.035(l),
requiring physicians to exercise reasonable care to protect the fetus' life and health; §§
188.010 et seq., § 188.040, declaring an infant who survives an abortion, which was not
performed to preserve the health of the mother, a ward of the state; § 188.050, prohibiting saline amniocentesis as deleterious to maternal health; §§ 188.050, 188.060, establishing record-keeping requirements to preserve maternal health. Plaintiffs attacked
these provisions on the grounds (among others) that they violated "the right to privacy
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federal district court 9 upheld the statute'0 and denied injunctive relief
12
against its enforcement." On appeal, the United States Supreme Court
reversed, 3 and HELD, the State may not require the consent of a
spouse or parent"5 as a condition to an abortion during the first twelve

weeks of pregnancy.
Historically, one of the earliest cases establishing one's right to
privacy of his physical being was Union Pacific Railway Co. v.
Botsford.'" There it was noted by the Court:
No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common law, than the right of every individual to the possession and control
of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of others, unless
by clear and unquestionable authority of law."7
The Court termed this the right "to be let alone."'"
In early fundamental rights cases, the courts applied the "rational
in the physician-patient relationship"; the female patient's right to determine whether
to bear children; the physician's right to due process of law under the Fourteenth
Amendment by requiring him to make decisions "beset. . . with inherent possibilities
of bias and conflict of interest."
9. 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1970) provides for a three-judge district court to determine
questions of the constitutionality of state statutes where, as here, a permanent injunction
restraining the operation of such a statute is sought.
10. Planned Phd. of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 392 F.Supp. 1362 (E.D. Mo. 1975).
1I. However, the court did find the first sentence of Mo. ANN. STAT. § 188.035(l)
(1974) unconstitutional because it failed to exclude the stage of pregnancy prior to
viability, and as such was overbroad. Id. at 1371.
12. 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1970) authorizes direct appeal to the Supreme Court from
the order of a three-judge panel in a federal district court.
13. The Supreme Court upheld § 188.015(2), defining viability, 96 S.Ct. at 2838.
The Court also upheld § 188.020(2), requiring free and informed consent by the patient,
id. at 2840; § 188.050, 188.060, pertaining to making and keeping of records of all
abortions performed, id. at 2847. The Supreme Court declared § 188.050, proscribing
saline amniocentesis as a method of abortion, unconstitutional as an "unreasonable or
arbitrary regulation designed to inhibit. . . the vast majority of abortions after the first
twelve weeks." Id. at 2845.
14. Id. at 2842 (White, J., Berger, C.J., Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
15. Id. at 2844 (White, J., Berger, C.J., Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
16. 141 U.S. 250 (1891). In this case, the Court upheld the refusal to require Mrs.
Botsford to submit to surgical diagnosis as a result of her suit for personal injuries
against the Union Pacific Railway for damage sustained when an upper berth in a
sleeping car fell on her head.
17. Id. at 251.
18. Id.
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relationship test"" as the standard to determine whether exercises of
state police powers were proper. Under this test, the states were allowed
broad discretion in exercising their police power, but were required to
maintain a reasonable connection between a statute's effect and a state's
interest in restricting rights of its citizens. 2
More recent fundamental rights cases have held that a compelling
governmental interest is required where the state seeks to restrict an
individual's fundamental rights.2' In addition to the enumerated rights,
such as the right of free speech, the right to a jury trial, and the right
of freedom from self-incrimination, the Supreme Court, in Griswold v.
Connecticut,2 established that "specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights
have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help
19. See Comment, Equal Protectionof the Laws: EducationIs Not a Fundamental Right, 26 U. FLA. L. R. 155 (1973) (hereinafter cited as Education Is Not a
Fundamental Right). See also Constitutional Law-Abortion Parentaland Spousal
Consent Requirements Violate Right to Privacy in Abortion Decision, 24 KAN. L. REv.
446, note 17 at 448 (1976).
20. Id. An example of the rational relationship test arose in the 1923 Supreme
Court case Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). In this case, a man was convicted
for violating a Nebraska statute prohibiting the teaching of any subject in any language
other than English, and the teaching of any foreign language to any student before the
eighth grade. In overturning the conviction, the Supreme Court relied on the Fourteenth
Amendment, noting:
Without doubt it denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the
right of the individual to contract. . . to marry, establish a home and bring up
children and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law
as the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men. . . .The established doctrine is
that this liberty may not be interfered with, under the guise of protecting the
public interest, by legislative action which is arbitrary or without reasonable
relation to some purpose within the competency of the State to effect (emphasis
added). Id.
21. "It is basic that no showing merely of a reasonable relationship to some
colorable state interest would suffice; in this highly sensitive constitutional area, only
the gravest abuses endangering paramount interest give occasion for permissible limitation." Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406, citing Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516,
530 (1945). See Education is Not a FundamentalRight, note 19 supra, citing Skinner
v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) as the first case to distinguish between strict judicial
scrutiny and a "reasonable relationship" standard.
22. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). In Griswold, appellants gave information, instruction,
and medical advice to a married couple for the prevention of conception. Upon examination, appellant prescribed, to the wife, the best means suited to her. As a result,
appellant was arrested and convicted for violating a Connecticut statute prohibiting the
use of, or assisting in the use of, any drug or device to prevent conception. The Supreme
Court reversed the conviction and found the statute to be unconstitutional as a violation
of the right of privacy. Id. at 485.
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give them life and substance. Various guarantees create zones of privacy." 23 In Griswold, appellant, a licensed physician, was convicted for
giving information, instruction, and medical advice to married persons
concerning the means of preventing conception.2 The Court reversed
the conviction and established the right to privacy as fundamental, noting that it was "no less important than any other right carefully and
particularly reserved to the people."'
Faced with the question of the right to an abortion, the Supreme
Court, in Roe v. Wade. 2 established that a woman's decision to terminate her pregnancy lies within the "zone of privacy," and as a result,
regulation of abortions must be narrowly drafted to express only legitimate state interests.? While Roe v. Wade established the right to an
abortion as fundamental, it was silent as to whether requirements of
spousal or parental consent were within the scope of compelling state
interests.'
These questions were first answered by the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals in Poe v. Gerstein,"° wherein the court was faced with the
question of the constitutionality of a Florida statute3 ' requiring parental consent for a minor to obtain an abortion and spousal consent for a
married woman to obtain an abortion. The court acknowledged that a
state has broader authority over children's activities than over the similar activities of adults. 32 However, the court found fundamental privacy
rights established under Roe to apply also to minors, and found the
interests set forth by the state in Poe insufficient to establish a compel23. Id. at 484.

24. Id. at 480.
25. Id. at 485.
26. 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
27. Id. at 153.

28. Id. at 155.
29. Id. at 165 note 67.
30. 517 F.2d 787 (5th Cir. 1975).
31. § 458.22(3), FLA. STAT. (1975). This statute provides in part: "One of the

following shall be obtained by the physician prior to terminating a pregnancy: (a) [I1f
she [the pregnant woman] is married, the written consent of her husband unless the
husband is voluntarily living apart from the wife, or (b) If the pregnant woman is under
18 years of age and unmarried, in addition to her written request, the written consent
of the custodian or legal guardian must be obtained."
32. Poe v. Gerstein, 517 F.2d 787 (5th Cir. 1975). The court cited as an example
"the power of state to prohibit children from viewing material to which an adult would
have a constitutional right." Id. citing Mckeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
33.

Id. at 791.
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ling state interest in requiring parental consent.? As a result, the court
found the statute unconstitutional."
The court, in Poe, also struck down a portion of the statute which
inquired consent of the spouse for a married woman to obtain an abortion.3 The court held the state's interest in protecting the rights of the
husband,7 or in maintaining the stability of society, s insufficient in
light of the fundamental rights of the woman.
The present case was the first opportunity3 for the Supreme Court
to resolve the issue concerning the legitimacy of state interests in requiring consent, either spousal or parental4 ° While the Court did not specifically say that the state's interests in protecting the husband's rights were
not legitimate, it did find that these interests were not sufficiently
"compelling" to warrant restriction of the woman's fundamental per1
sonal right of privacy.
The Court noted its awareness of the "deep and proper concern and
interest that a devoted and protective husband has in his wife's preg-2
nancy and in the growth and development of the fetus she is carrying.'
However, the Court expressed the opinion that the strength of a marriage or family will not be benefited by providing the husband the power
of ultimate decision over his wife's actions with regard to abortions. 3
Balancing the interests of the wife and husband, the Supreme Court held
that the wife's interest is greater, noting: "Since it is the woman who
physically bears the child and who is more directly and immediately
affected by the pregnancy, as between the two, the balance weighs in
her favor."" Since the rights of the state are not sufficient to merit
34. Id. at 792-94. The interests deemed as sufficient by the state to justify restricting the minor's right were: preventing illicit sexual conduct among minors; protecting

minors from their own improvidence; fostering parental control; and supporting the
family as
35.
36.
37.

a social unit.
Poe v. Gerstein, 517 F.2d 787, 794 (5th Cir. 1975).
§ 458.22(3)(a) FLA. STAT. (1975).
Poe v. Gerstein, 517 F.2d 787, 795 (5th Cir. 1975).

38. Id.
39. See text accompanying note 27 supra.
40. The issue was a very real one in light of the fact that Poe v. Gersteinhad held
Florida's consent requirements invalid, while the three-judge district court upheld those
of Missouri in the instant case. See text accompanying notes 6 and 7 supra.
41. 96 S.Ct. at 2842.
42. Id. at 2841.
43. Id. at 2842. "It seems manifest that ideally, the decision to terminate a
pregnancy should be one concurred in by both the wife and her husband."
44. id.
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unreasonable restrictions of the woman's privacy, at least in the first
trimester, the Court held that the state could not give authority to the
husband which the state itself did not have."5
The Supreme Court, by its decision in the present case, affirms the
conclusion reached by the United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, in Poe v. Gerstein." In Poe, the court discussed various interests
which the father may have in the fetus, and analyzed these rights as they
exist throughout the term of the pregnancy. The court also analyzed a
state's interest in protecting the father's rights." By citing Griswold v.
Connecticut," the Fifth Circuit disposed of the state's assertion of an
interest in the stability of society ahd the well-being of its citizens and
concluded that no case has "sanctioned state determination of intrafamilial decision making process with regard to child bearing decisions."',
While the Court refused to sanction state interference with family
decisions, it did hold the state's interest in protecting the husband's
rights regarding the fetus to be more substantial, noting that his interest
"would most logically emanate from his paternity of the fetus, and thus
appear analytically as a precursor of the father's relational interest in
his child."5 ' O The Court noted, however, that "since a fetus is not a
person," as established in Roe v. Wade," "neither is it a child." 52 The
logic of paternal interest was further weakened by the fact that the
statute did not require the husband to be the father of the potential child
in order to give him the power of consent1
The findings by the district court in the present case are contradictory to those of the Fifth Circuit in Poe." While the court did not
directly address the issue of paternal rights, the court did analyze the
state's interest in protecting the marriage and familial relationship. The
45.
46.
47.

Id.
Poe v. Gerstein, 517 F.2d 787, 794-96 (5th Cir. 1975).
Id. at 795. The Court noted two interests which the father might have that

would be endangered by his wife's abortion. First, an interest in the fetus with which
his wife is currently pregnant; and, secondly, an interest in the procreation protential
of the marriage.
48. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
49. Poe v. Gerstein, 517 F.2d 787, 795 (5th Cir. 1975).

50. Id.
51. 410 U.S. 113, 156-58 (1973).
52. Poe v. Gerstein, 517 F.2d 787, 796 (5th Cir. 1975).
53. Id. at 796.
54. Planned Phd. of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 392 F.Supp. 1362 (E.D. Mo. 1975).

However, Webster, J., in the dissent find' agreement with Poe and supports its conclusions. Id. at 1374.
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district court held that the only state interests involved in Roe " were
the protection of maternal health and the protection of the fetus.5 '
In upholding the Missouri consent statutes, the district court relied
on a series of cases which regard marriage as an institution, 7 and establish the right of procreation as fundamental to a marriage." The court
stated: "The interest of the state in protecting the mutuality of decisions
vital to the marriage relationship is compelling at all times during the
marriage." 5 '
As noted previously, 0 the Supreme Court in the instant case was
in accord with the reasoning of Poe.61 However, the Court did not find
the spouse to be without an interest in the abortion decision. The Court
simply found that any interest of the spouse was not sufficiently compelling for the state to restrict the woman's right to privacy.12 The Court
noted that the decision to have an abortion should be made jointly by
the husband and wife, noting: "No marriage may be viewed as harmonious or successful if the marriage partners are fundamentally divided on
so important and vital an issue." 5 ' While supporting a mutual decision
by the parties, the Court concluded that this mutuality would not be
enhanced "by giving the husband a vjeto power exercisable for any reason, or for no reason at all."" When disagreement exists it should be
the woman who determines the outcome, since she physically bears the
burden of carrying the child."5
The decision reached in the present case resolves but a few of the
many questions arising from the abortion issue. For instance, how
55. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
56. Planned Phd. of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 392 F.Supp. 1362, 1369 (E.D. Mo.
1975).
57. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 165 (1878), finding marriage to
be a social contract usually regulated by law, with which government is necessarily
required to deal. Maynard v. Hill, 135 U.S. 190 (1888), noting marriage as creating the
most important relation in life, and as having always been subject to the control of the
legislature.
58. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942), holding procreation to be a
fundamental aspect of marriage.
59. Planned Phd. of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 392 F.Supp. 1362,1370 (E.D. Mo.
1975).
60. See text accompanying note 46 supra.
61. 96 S.Ct. 2831.
62. Id. at 2842.
63. Id.

64. Id.
65.

Id.
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broadly does the right of privacy extend in preventing the necessity of
parental consent for medical treatment requested by a minor? Florida
Attorney General Robert Shevin has pointed out that the instant decision is "limited strictly to abortions and only because of the right of
privacy issue

. . .

you can't say that in terms of an operation or any

other surgical procedure."" Still, consent provisions appear valid for
some operations.
While it is clear that the present decision is based on the private
nature of abortion, it would seem illogical to assume that control over
certain parts of the body is within the realm of the right of privacy while
control over other parts, such as the ears, face, or even the genitals, 8 is
not.
A second issue arising is that, in being provided the right to obtain
an abortion without spousal consent, the wife now has the ability to
determine whether procreation will take place within the marriage. In
a discussion of Doe v. Doe"' it was noted that "the assertion of a legal
right by the wife, by obtaining an abortion may establish new ground
for divorce." 70 If the denial of procreation were not allowed as the basis
for a divorce action, then assertion of the wife's right would control any
potential right of procreation which the husband might have, since adultery generally is illegal" and socially disfavored.
A third result of the present decision is the potential power of
extortion given to a pregnant woman. If an unmarried woman becomes
pregnant, for example, she has the option of giving birth to the child
and forcing the father to provide for its support or of having an abortion
and freeing the father from any obligation to support. To extend this a
step further, the woman could bargain with the father for a certain sum
as consideration for her undergoing an abortion. Since the
"compensation" would be hers, with no cost of maintaining the child
66. Miami Herald, July 16, 1976, Sec. AA at 1.
67. Id. For example, a person under eighteen years of age who chooses to have
his or her ears pierced must produce a consent form signed by his or her parent.
68. Id. The article points out that sterilization of a boy or girl under eighteen still
requires the consent of a parent.
69.

Doe v. Doe, 314 N.E. 2d 128 (1974).

70. Comment II NEw ENGLAND L. REV., 205, 222 (1975). This proposition is
based on the notion that procreation is fundamental to marriage.
71. Id. at 222. See § 798.01 FLA. STAT. (1975), and § 798.03 FLA. STAT. (1975),
proscribing adultery.
72. Id.
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(since there would not be a birth, and the father could pay a large
amount and still not incur the expense of supporting a child for the
period of minority), this could become a lucrative proposition on the
part of the mother. This "bartering" for an abortion would enable
73
potential parents to circumvent the holding in Shinall v. Pergeorelis,
that "a release executed by a mother is invalid to the extent that it
purports to affect the rights of the child."7 This enables the mother to
bargain away any rights the fetus might have if it were to become a
child.
To carry the implication of the present case to a logical extreme,
it might be argued that since the choice of bringing the child into the
world is ultimately that of the mother, she should bear full responsibility
for, and have full control over, the child. This argument could be made
in the following manner: The decision of Roe held that a fetus is not a
person during the first trimester of pregnancy. As a result, the woman
has total determinative power over whether the fetus becomes a child. 75
Since the father only helped to set in motion the biological functions
which created the fetus, his responsibility (and liability) should extend
only that far. He should be responsible only for damages incurred because of his actions up to and including the abortion. Any decision to
proceed beyond the fetal stage of pregnancy is that of the mother, and
she should therefore accept responsibility for the birth of the child and
its support.
Four basic problem areas have been presented which result from
the decisions reached by the Court in Planned Parenthood: the scope
of the consent requirement for minors; the power of the wife to determine the occurrence of procreation in the marriage; the potential extortionary power given to the pregnant woman; and the argument for the
mother's liability for a child after the first trimester of pregnancy. These
four areas illustrate some of the critical issues to be dealt with in the
73. Shinall v. Pergeorelis, 325 So.2d 431 (Fla. lit DCA 1975). Inthis case, a
single woman who had become pregnant initiated an action against the putative father.
As a result of pre-trial negotiations, the mother executed a release to the putative father,
in return for $500 and a signed admission that the child was the father's. Soon thereafter,
the mother again instituted paternity proceedings against the father. The court held that
the release was invalid on the principle that an illegitimate child's right to support from
its putative father cannot be contracted away by its mother.
74. Id. at 433, citing Walker v. Walker, 266 So. 2d 385 (Fla. 1st DCA 1973).
75. Based on the present holding that the abortion decision is ultimately that of
the mother. 96 S.Ct. 2381.
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complex framework of abortion. The burden is now placed on the individual states to provide the constitutional protection to which the
mother is entitled, as well as protection for the potential father and
child.
David F. Holmes
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